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When an expert witness is retained, who has the responsibility to pay
the expert's fee? Is the attorney that retains the expert personally liable,
or does the client alone incur the responsibility? 1
The question of an attorney's personal liability is a matter of concern
for several reasons. Anecdotal reports that have been shared with us
suggest this question is a common one. A determination of exactly how
common is difficult because no judicial opinion has been reported in
California on this precise question. The issue is thus a matter of first
impression. Although many California opinions deal with agency law
and the disclosed agency concept, these cases are not necessarily a
reliable guide to the determination of attorney liability for expert witness
fees. The proper resolution of attorney liability for expert witness fees
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1. The question is presented as a disjunctive in order to promote the focused
analysis of the issue. The question could also be presented in terms of primarysecondary liability or in terms of liability based on surety law.
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is further complicated because the question has not attracted scholarly
attention or comment.2
One possibility for the absence of direct authority in California is that
the civil code provision dealing with an agent's liability to a third party3
may have discouraged litigation since it seems to preclude. finding an
attorney personally liable. Another reason may be that the relatively
small amount usually claimed means the issue is not apt to be litigated
or reported in a judicial opinion.
Notwithstanding the dearth of analysis, the issue is worthy of
discussion. The State Bar of California has received a number of
complaints from experts concerning the failure of attorneys to pay
witness fees. One dispute involving the claim of a court reporter against
an attorney has resulted in a formal opinion.4 Public confidence in the
legal profession is threatened if attorneys are able to avoid legal
obligations unfairly. Clarification of an attorney's personal liability is
thus in the public interest.
The issue of an attorney's personal liability for expert fees has been
litigated in a few other states. Those states are divided in their approach
to liability. Some states exempt the attorney from liability, whereas
other states find the attorney personally liable. 5 The most recent judicial
opinions suggest that the law seems to be moving in the direction of
imposing liability.
The purpose of this Article is to analyze under what circumstances an
attorney who contractually retains an expert witness may be personally
liable to the expert under the law of California. This inquiry necessitates
an examination of whether the attorney may avoid personal liability to
the expert on the theory that the contract with the expert was made by
an agent for a disclosed principal. It also requires an analysis of the
California civil code provision that covers an agent's liability to a third
party.
This Article consists of five parts. Part I provides the basic background necessary to analyze the issue by presenting the problem through
an illustrative typical case. Part II briefly explores a variety of potential
theories under which an attorney might be held liable for an expert's fee.
It identifies contract law as the paramount basis to support a claim and
addresses the agency law implications. Part III analyzes the consider-

2. Our search has yielded only one article dealing with the issue, and it is
primarily descriptive in nature. See generally D. Keith Andress, Attorney's Liability for
Witness Fees and Court Costs, 18 J. LEGAL PROF. 401 (1993).
3. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 2343 (West 1985).
4. See infra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 86-107 and accompanying text.
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ations that support treating the attorney as a principal when the attorney
acts to procure services to be used in representing a client, including
hiring expert witnesses. It develops the argument that treating an
attorney as a principal should be the normative approach to liability.
Although treating the attorney as a principal has the effect of making the
California statute concerning an agent's responsibility to third persons
inapplicable in these cases, Part IV analyzes the California statute. It
demonstrates that, even if the attorney were characterized as an agent for
purposes of retaining an expert, the proper application of the statute
nevertheless can provide a fruitful source of argument to hold the
attorney personally liable. Part V provides our conclusions.

I.

A TYPICAL CASE

The following scenario provides a framework for considering the
question of personal liability. 6 In thinking about hiring an expert, the
attorney considers the possible uses of the expert. An expert can
provide services to an attorney either as a consultant or as a prospective
trial witness. 7 Often, an attorney will retain an expert initially in a
consulting capacity. This initial relationship may be subject to the
understanding that should the attorney and expert agree, the expert may
be used subsequently as a witness at the deposition or trial stage of the
case. This two-step approach is used by attorneys primarily for strategic
reasons relating to the law of discovery. The opinions generated by
consulting experts are subject to conditional work-product protection,
and therefore are not discoverable. 8 However, once the expert is
designated by the attorney as a trial witness, the right of discovery
attaches. 9
After reviewing a client's case, the attorney often decides that an
expert is necessary for both consultation purposes and as a trial witness.
Having determined the need, the attorney secures authorization from the

6. This scenario is based on Professor Minan's recent experience as an expert.
7. If the expert provides consulting services normally expected to be provided by
the attorney as part of the attorney's compensation agreement with the client, the
expert's fee may have to be borne by the attorney rather than charged to the client as
costs. WILLIAM F. FLAHAVAN ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE; PERSONAL INJURY
'If 2: 1040.2 (1996).
8. Williamson v. Superior Court, 582 P.2d 126, 129 (Cal. 1978).
9. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 2034 (West Supp. 1997).
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client to hire an expert. The attorney reasons that the sooner the expert
is retained the better. 10 At a minimum, the attorney realizes that having
an expert available often is helpful to settlement negotiations. In
addition, the attorney is aware that the testimony of the expert will be
necessary to prevail on the substantive claim. Unfortunately, unless care
is exercised, the attorney's desire to inove quickly may contribute to
misunderstandings about the attorney's liability to the expert.
After a careful search for the right person, the attorney hires the
needed expert. 11 The attorney sends a letter to the expert which states:
"The referenced litigation will go forward. I would like to retain you as
an expert with respect to the following issues," which are thereafter
described in detail. The amount of the expert's fee is acknowledged in
the letter to the expert.
After sending the letter, the attorney officially designates the expert
pursuant to the exchange of information required under the law of
discovery. 12 The attorney also sends a substantial quantity of materials
to the expert for review. The expert studies these materials, engages in
supporting research, and prepares to be deposed in anticipation of the
pending litigation.
·
The parties to the litigation, with the assistance of their respective
attorneys, enter into a settlement agreement that obviates the necessity
of either deposing the expert or using the expert at trial. As a result, the
deposition that had been scheduled for the expert is canceled. Pursuant
to the terms of the settlement agreement, the case is dismissed. The
expert is told by the attorney that the matter is concluded and the expert
will not be needed.
From the expert's perspective, the matter is not concluded because he
or she has not been paid. After the billing notices sent by the expert for
payment of the fee are ignored by the attorney, perhaps in hope that the
expert will go away given the relatively small amount of the claim, the
attorney :finally responds to the persistent claims by the expert for
payment. The attorney acknowledges hiring the expert, but takes the
position that the expert's claim for payment must be made solely against
the client. The attorney contends that in hiring the expert, he or she was
acting merely as an agent on behalf of a discloseq principal, and

l 0. The "fast tracking" provisions of the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act, CAL.
Gov'T. CODE §§ 68600-20 (West Supp. 1997), increase the need to hire experts
promptly.
11. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 1995) (defining standards for the
admissibility of expert opinion testimony).
12. See discussion of Wrongful Conduct and the Discovery Process infra Part
IV.C.l.
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therefore is not legally responsible for payment of the expert's fee. The
expert, on the other hand, believes that the attorney is the financially
responsible party. When the matter is not resolved between them, the
expert sues the attorney for recovery of the fee.
II.

POTENTIAL THEORIES OF ATTORNEY LIABILITY

An expert may consider a number of potential theories to support a
claim for fees in litigation against the retaining attorney. These include
breach of warranty, tortious misrepresentation, bad-faith denial of
contract, quantum meruit, and breach of contract. Because claims by
most experts will be based on a contract, this theory is the main focus
of the Article.

A.

Breach of Warranty

A warranty theory can apply in certain situations. An attorney
purportinf: to act on a client's behalf warrants that he or she has proper
authority. 3 If the client repudiates a contract that the attorney enters
into with an expert because it was unauthorized by the client, the
attorney could be liable for a breach of warranty. This claim may be
formulated under either a contract or a tort theory. 14
The California Practice Guide concerning civil trials makes the
following observations with respect to an attorney's authority to engage
witnesses: "Attorneys usually have at least implied authority from their
clients to employ expert witnesses. Even so, it is good practice to ask
for express authority before doing so; and to insist upon adequate
financial arrangements to assure payment of the expert's fees." 15
The availability of the breach of warranty claim in the context of hiring
expert witnesses thus is likely to be of limited applicability because of
the relevance of implied authority. 16

13. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2342 (West 1985).
.14. See Tri-Delta Eng'g, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 146 Cal. Rptr. 14, 18-19
(1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 329 (1958).
15. WILLIAM E. WEGNER ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL TRIALs AND
EVIDENCE ,r 1:223 (1995).
16. The implied authority is well-grounded in established custom that affects
contracting with experts. For a discussion of the role of custom, see infra Part III.B.
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B.

Tortious Misrepresentation

An expert can sue under the theory of tortious misrepresentation if an
attorney negligently or intentionally misrepresented the attorney's
authority to engage the expert. 17 This theory also would be inapplicable in most cases due to the implied or apparent authority of the
attorney. A claim sounding in tort might seem attractive, given the
opportunity to seek punitive damages. The difficulty of proving
damages in tort, however, makes it more likely that an expert would
base a claim on breach of contract.
C.

Bad-faith Denial of Contract

California law once provided a basis by which an expert might have
pursued a claim against an attorney if the expert was retained and the
attorney later denied the existence of their contract. In Seaman s Direct
Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 18 a case that
drew significant national attention, the Supreme Court of California
created a new tort that was potentially applicable to all contracts. It was
the tort of bad-faith denial of the existence of a contract, according to
which "a party may incur tort remedies when, in addition to breaching
the contract, it seeks to shield itself from liability by denying, in bad
faith and without probable cause, that the contract exists." 19
The California Supreme Court recently overturned Seamans in
Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co.,20 where the court held that
the denial of a contract by the defendant oil company did not create a
remedy in tort. 21 The court adopted a general rule precluding tort
recovery for noninsurance contract breach,22 at least in the absence of
a violation of an independent duty arising from principles of tort law
other than bad-faith denial of the existence of, or liability under, the
breached contract.23 As a result of this decision, the tort of bad-faith
denial of contract is no longer likely to be a viable legal theory for the
expert to argue.

17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 330 (1958).
18. 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984).
19. Id. at 1167.
20. 900 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995).
21. Id. at 680.
22. Insurance law is the area of the law that has had the most consistent and
substantial success with the tortious breach of contract theory. The case that provided
major impetus to the theory was Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
23. Freeman & Mills, 900 P.2d at 679-80.
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D.

Quantum Meruit

An attorney might discuss possible engagement with an expert or
consultant without actually entering into a contract. The expert or
consultant might proceed with work on the case and provide work
product that benefits the attorney's efforts. In the absence of a contract
to support a claim for recovery, the expert would be relegated to a
theory of quantum meruit in which he or she would have to establish
unjust enrichment. Recovery would then be based on the reasonable
value of the services that the expert or consultant provided to the
attorney. 24 This theory will have limited applicability in the expert
witness context because most experienced experts will not commence
any efforts for an attorney until an agreement to retain the expert is
completed. 25

E.

Contract and the Disclosed Agency Principle

Experienced experts insist upon a contractual commitment before they
proceed with any work. The contract is likely to be the central focus of
any claim that the expert will assert. The contract will determine
whether the expert was hired, the scope of employment, and the terms
of compensation. In most instances, the fact that the expert has been
retained is not a matter of controversy. Unless the attorney makes it
clear to the expert that approval for hiring the expert still has to come
from, the client or perhaps an insurance carrier, the attorney certainly has
at least apparent authority to engage the expert.26 An expert who is
made aware that his or her retention is contingent upon the approval of
a third party is unlikely to commence work on the case until the
contingency is clarified. If the expert is retained by the attorney, the

24. In the absence of a contract, the expert would not have an expectation interest
to be protected. Quantum meruit is based on protecting the restitution interest.
25. The court in Theuerkauf v. Sutton, 306 N.W.2d 651 (Wis. 1981), applied
quantum meruit as the basis to hold an attorney liable for the accounting services that
the plaintiff provided an attorney for three divorce cases. Id. at 663. The court analyzed
the case as an implied-in-fact contract and awarded what it described as the reasonable
value of the services provided. Id. at 659, 663. The attorney and accountant agreed
upon the price and the attorney engaged the accountant. Id. at 660-61. Arguably, the
case would have been more appropriately analyzed as an express contract.
26. WEGNER ET AL., supra note 15.
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expert clearly has a contract as the basis to support a claim for the
payment due for work completed within the scope of the contract.
In pursuing payment from the attorney for services provided, however,
the expert may be confronted with a legal obstacJe based on agency law.
The attorney might argue that, in contracting with the expert, he or she
was acting as the agent for a disclosed principal. Agency law generally
provides that the acts and contracts of an agent on behalf of a disclosed
principal, when conducted within the scope of the agent's authority, are
considered to be the. acts and contracts of the principal, not the agent. 27
Ample case authority in California is consistent with this general
proposition.28 If the attorney can avoid liability on this theory, the
expert will be forced to look to the client or insurance carrier for
payment, if that option is still available, 29 or forgo the claim. If this
approach is applied, the expert loses a claim against the attorney, but not
necessarily against the client.
In Part III of this article, we will demonstrate the shortcomings of this
approach in the context of the witness-fee issue and argue instead that
treating an attorney as a principal should be the normative approach to
liability. We do recognize, however, that the latter approach may not be
sound in all situations. If the expert has dealt directly with the client
with respect to payment of the fee, rather than the attorney, the rationale
to treat the attorney as a principal probably would be missing. ·. In
addition, when the expert is hired by an attorney who works for a
government agency or as in-house counsel for a corporation, the expert
cannot reasonably look to the attorney as a principal. In these cases, the
normal expectation of both the expert and the attorney is that the
attorney is not personally liable as a principal. Absent these situations,
however, the preferable approach is to treat the attorney as a principal
who assumes personal liability for expert witness fees.
·
The agency law principle that is the linchpin of the argument against
personal liability is seemingly buttressed by a provision of the California
civil code that deals with the obligations of an agent. Section 2343 of

27. "Unless otherwise agreed, a person making or purporting to make a contract
with another as agent for a disclosed principal does not become a party to the contract."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 320 (1958); see also Hamilton Music, Inc. v.
Gordon A. Gundaker Real Estate Co., Inc., 666 S.W.2d 840, 845 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)
(third parties generally have no action against agents of disclosed principals); Potter v.
Chaney, 290 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956) (agent generally not liable).
28. See, e.g., Heringer v. Schumacher, 263 P. 550 (Cal. 1928).
29. The claim may be foreclosed by the statute of limitations. In California, the
statute of limitations for oral contracts is two years from the date of breach, whereas for
written contracts it is four years. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE§§ 337, 339 (West 1982).
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the civil code, which is entitled "Agent's Responsibility to Third
Persons," provides:
One who assumes to act as an agent is responsible to third persons as a
principal for his acts in the course of his agency, in any of the following cases,
and in no others: 1. When, with his consent, credit is given to him personally
in a transaction; 2. When he enters into a written contract in the name of his
principal, without believing, in good faith, that he has authority to do so; or, 3.
When his acts are wrongful in their nature. 30

Absent the application of any of the enumerated circumstances, this
section appears to preclude liability of the attorney. Caution is required
in applying the statute, however, because it was enacted in 1872 and has
not been applied to attorneys in any reported decisions ..
Section 2343 is not as sweeping as it might first appear. The statutory
requirement that the individual "assumes to act as an agent" is an
important qualification, because if the attorney does not assume to act
as an agent, the section is inapplicable by its own terms. Consequently,
a closer examination of this section and the attorney-client relationship
is warranted.

III.

THE

ATTORNEY AS A PRINCIPAL

A.

More Than an Agent

The central idea underlying an agency relationship is "the right to
control the conduct of the agent with respect to matters entrusted" and
the corresponding obligation of the agent to follow the instructions of
the principal. 31 Agency law employs various tenets to further this idea.
Foremost among these tenets is that the acts and contracts of an agent
on behalf of a disclosed principal, while acting within the scope of the
agent's authority, are considered to be the acts and contracts of the
principal, not the agent. 32 This tenet is referred to as the disclosed
agency rule.
Referring to an attorney as the agent of his or her client is appropriate
for some purposes. The attorney must generally follow the directions

30.
31.
32.
11, § 18

CAL. CIV. CODE§ 2343 (West 1985).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 14 (1958).
Id. § 320; H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP, ch.
(1979); Ingram v. Lupo, 726 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
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and protect the interests of the client. Although the attorney has the
apparent or inherent authority as part of the professional relationship to
make procedural or tactical decisions, he or she does not have the
inherent authority to commence legal proceedings or impair the client's
substantive rights or the cause of action itself. Matters affecting the
substance of the client's case can and should be made by the client, with
the advice of the attorney. 33
In other respects the attorney is more than a mere agent. 34 The
attorney is governed by the rules of professional conduct which may
transcend the application of agency principles. 35 Thus, the attorney is
not bound to carry out a client's decision that the attorney reasonably
believes to be contrary to the professional rules of conduct or other
law.36 It is equally important to realize that these rules do not bar the
imposition of personal contractual liability on the attorney. Under the
California Rules of Professional Conduct, it is ethically proper for an
attorney to pay or to guarantee payment of a reasonable fee for the
professional services of an expert witness.37
33. One author argues that the traditional substantive/procedural test does not
adequately explain the cases which address the power of the lawyer to bind his client,
and that the cases are better explained on the basis of considerations of prejudice and
judicial economy, with the timing of the client's objection being a key consideration.
See Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the
Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41, 54-65 (1979).
34. As between client and lawyer, a lawyer retains the authority, which may not
be overridden by an agreement or an instruction from the client:
(!) To refuse to perform, counsel or assist future or ongoing acts that the
lawyer reasonably believes to be unlawful;
(2) To make decisions that law or an order of a tribunal requires the lawyer
to make; and
(3) To decide what should be done on behalf of the client when law or an
order of a tribunal requires an immediate decision without time to consult the
client.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34 (Tentative Draft No. 5,
1992); see also Spiegel, supra note 33, at 49-60 (discussing judicial decisions which
indicate that an attorney is not required to follow a client's directions as to procedural
matters).
35. See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983) (attorney's failure to
follow client's instructions held not to be ineffective assistance of counsel); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 32 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No.
5, 1992).
36. For instance, the California Supreme Court has held that it would be improper
for an attorney to negotiate the return of stolen property in exchange for the owner's
agreement not to report the theft to the police or prosecutorial authorities. People v.
Pie'!, 646 P.2d 847 (Cal. 1982); see also CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
3-210 (West 1996) (regarding an attorney's advising a violation of the law).
37. "Except where prohibited by law, a member may advance, guarantee, or
acquiesce in the payment of ... [a] reasonable fee for the professional services of an
expert witness." CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5-310(B)(3) (West
1996). Several courts have made similar rulings with respect to the rules of professional
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Pursuant to this professional relationship, the attorney assumes the
responsibility to conduct litigation.38 With oversight by the client,
litigation is usually prepared, managed, and conducted by attorneys.
Traditionally, the delineation of clear rules for decision-making authority
between client and attorney have been difficult to apply when the
attorney and client have not made clear what matters are reserved to the
attorney's authority and what matters require client approval. Arriving
at a proper delineation involves practical, ethical, and philosophical
considerations.39
Notwithstanding the difficulty of drawing clear lines as to the
attorney's inherent authority incident to the professional relationship,
knowing when expert witnesses are needed and obtaining them is part
of the attorney's job. The attorney normally selects, contacts, negotiates
with, and engages the expert, and thereafter briefs the expert on the facts
of the case and directs the. expert with respect to the scope of the
expert's engagement. These functions are part of the attorney's
management responsibilities. The attorney's exclusivity of control in
creating the working relationship with the expert obligates the attorney
to ensure that the expert is compensated according to the agreement
between the attorney and the expert.
An attorney owes duties to the client with respect to informing the
client, as well as coordinating and conducting the litigation. However,

conduct in their states. See Gualtieri v. Burleson, 353 S.E.2d 652, 655 (N.C. Ct. App.
1987) (Rule 5.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the North Carolina State Bar);
Theuerkaufv. Sutton, 306 N.W.2d 651,663 (Wis. 1981) (Supreme Court Rule 20.26(2)
of the Wisconsin Code of Professional Responsibility); Brown & Huseby, Inc. v.
Chrietzberg, 248 S.E.2d 631, 633 (Ga: 1978) (Rule DR5-103(B) of the State Bar of
Georgia); Molezzo Reporters v. Patt, 579 P.2d 1243, 1244 (Nev. 1978) (Nevada Supreme
Court Rule 183).
38. See William R. Mureiko, Note, The Agency Theory of the Attorney-Client

Relationship: An Improper Justification for Holding Clients Responsible for Their
Attorney's Procedural Errors, 1988 DUKE L.J. 733, 739 (exploring the historical basis
for attorneys' virtually unrestrained authority to act in procedural or tactical areas).
39. See Mureiko, supra note 38; Penelope Potter Polumbo, Note, Balancing
Competing Discovery Interests in the Context of the Attorney-Client Relationship: A
Trilemma, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115 (1983); Robert A. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between
Attorney and Client, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015 (1981); Susan R. Martyn, Informed Consent in
the Practice ofLaw, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 307 (1980); Spiegel, supra note 34; Mark
Spiegel, The New Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct: Lawyer-Client Decision Making
and the Role of Rules in Structuring the Lawyer-Client Dialogue, 1980 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 1003; Warren Lehman, The Pursuit ofa Client's Interest, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1078
(1979).
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the experts and consultants retained by the attorney provide their services
directly to the attorney, who then uses them in fulfilling his or her own
responsibilities to the client. The attorney thus also has a personal stake
in the nature and quality of the services provided. In contrast to the role
that attorneys play in advising and helping clients to enter into contracts
with other parties, the attorney conducting litigation does not act solely
in the role of an intermediary to bring the client and the expert together.
The attorney hires experts and consultants to assist the attorney in
meeting the attorney's responsibilities to the client.
The attorney inevitably must exercise some independent choices and
judgments, and therefore is more than a mere subordinate or agent of the
client. In dealing with both the expert and the client, the attorney
occupies a position of recognized importance beyond that of the typical
agent by virtue of his or her special training, experience, and professional standing. This special status enjoyed by the attorney has a direct
effect on the reasonable expectations of the expert. Unless the attorney
disclaims personal liability or tells the expert otherwise, the expert's
reasonable expectation is that he or she will be paid by the attorney, not
by the client. Disclosing the name of the attorney's client thus cannot
be sufficient to clothe all of the attorney's actions with respect to the
client's affairs in the mantle of an agent.
The Restatement of Agency attempts to capture the special relationship
between an attorney and the client by referring to the attorney as an
independent contractor.40
This characterization distinguishes the
attorney's role from that of servant or employee. 41 As used in the
Restatement, the term independent contractor is antithetical to the term
"servant," although not to the term agent. 42 Most courts subscribe to
the view that the attorney can be both an independent contractor and an
agent at the same time. 43
Court decisions concerning personal liability for other contracts that
attorneys enter to procure services in support of litigation are analogous
to the witness-fee issue. 44 In McCullough v. Johnson, 45 a court

40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §1 cmt. e (1958).
41. Id.
42. Id: § 14N cmt. a.
43. See, e.g., CBS v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 522 F.2d 369, 375 (2d Cir. 1975).
44. In finding the attorney personally liable, courts in many cases have stressed
that the attorney is in charge of the litigation. See Blake v. Ingraham, 540 N.E.2d 759,
760 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (transcription services); Gaines Reporting Serv. v. Mack, 447
N.E.2d 1317, 1318 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (preparation of transcript); Molezzo Reporters
v. Patt, 579 P.2d 1243, 1244 (Nev. 1978) (reporting services); Burt v. Gahan, 220
N.E.2d 817, 818 (Mass. 1966) (stenographic services); Judd & Detweiler, Inc. v.
Gittings, 43 App. D.C. 304, 310-11 (1915) (printing of briefs). The rationale has also
been used by some courts in finding attorneys liable to experts. Gualtieri v. Burleson,
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reporter brought an action against an attorney to recover the cost of a
transcript prepared for a client at the attorney's request. 46 The reporter
admitted that the attorney did not expressly promise to assume liability
for the cost of the transcript. 47 The attorney nevertheless was held
liable by the Supreme Court of Arkansas.48
The court described the trend toward imposing liability, noting that
some "jurisdictions have considered the agency relationship of the
attorney and client a modified one, treating the attorney as a principal
because his education, experience and professionalism render him in
charge of the litigation."49 In these jurisdictions, ''the attorney ordering
goods or services for the client will also be personally liable for those
expenses, in the absence of an express disclaimer of such responsibility."50 The effect of this reasoning places the burden on the attorney to
expressly disclaim responsibility if he or she is to avoid it. 51
Attorneys need to attain a variety of services from different sources in
order to conduct the litigation that is entrusted to their care. The costs
associated with transportation, telephoning, and postage are all paid by
the attorney, who in turn relies upon an agreement with the client for
reimbursement. Court costs and transcript fees are treated similarly.
The work performed on a case by an associate or clerk employed by the
law firm is also paid for by the firm and billed to the client in accordance with their agreement. In addition, services provided by an expert
or a consultant are part of the expenses the attorney necessarily incurs
in order to pursue the litigation. Attorneys concerned about being
responsible for any of these costs should make adequate prior arrangements with their clients and the service provider.
An attorney-client relationship thus creates an agent-principal
relationship for some purposes, but not for others. The characterization
is not applied legitimately to an attorney retaining an expert witness for
purposes of litigating a client's legal interests. Because an attorney

353 S.E.2d 652,655 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (neuropsychiatrist); Theuerkaufv. Sutton, 306
N.W.2d 651, 661-62 (Wis. 1981) (accounting services).
45. 816 S.W.2d 886 (Ark. 1991).
46. Id. at 887.
·47_ Id.
48. Id. at 888.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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should not be considered an agent in this context, the attorney should not
avoid responsibility to an expert based on the assertion that he or she
was acting as an agent for a disclosed principal. The attorney acted as
a principal in hiring the expert.
Section 2343 of the California Civil Code appears to dictate a different
result. It limits liability to third persons as a principal to three enumerated situations when one "assumes to act as an agent." 52 An attorney
might use this provision to assert that he or she assumed to act as an
agent on behalf of the client in hiring experts. The issue thus becomes
how section 2343 should be construed in the context of liability for
witness fees.
An early California case supports the view that persons who assert that
they acted as agents on behalf of a principal can nevertheless be found
to be a principal. Twelve years after enactment of Civil Code section
2343, and while presumably aware of its existence, the California
Supreme Court had the opportunity to consider the personal liability of
a purported agent in Murphy v. Helmrich. 53 The defendants argued that
they were not liable on a contract because they had acted in the capacity
of brokers for another person for whom they had purchased one hundred
shares of gas stock. 54 The court found that defendants' signing their
own names to the agreement bound them as principals, "even if they
were acting for another, unless it was so understood and intended
. between them and their vendor." 55 The court observed, "[w]here an
agent does not attempt in an instrument to bind his principal, and in
terms imposes the obligation on himself, the rule is that he incurs by
such act a personal liability, even although he described himself as
agent." 56 This early California decision supports the premise that the
mere assertion of agency status is not sufficient to avoid personal
liability.
A later opinion is even more directly on point with respect to the
appropriate construction of section 2343. In Heringer v. Schumacher, 57
the defendant, having purchased beans for the account of a named
individual, was sued for the price by the seller. 58 The court of appeal
found in favor of the defendant because the intention to bind only the

52. CAL. CIV.CODE § 2343 (West 1985). See supra text accompanying note 30
for the full language of this statute.
53. 4 P. 958, 959-60 (Cal. 1884). The court did not discuss section 2343 in its
opinion.
. 54. Id. at 958.
55. Id. at 959.
56. Id.
57. 263 P. 550 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928).
58. Id. at 551.
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principal was clear and the purchase agreement was signed by only the
principal. 59 The court focused on the intention of the agent in this case
to bind himself. 60 It found the following language of Corpus Juris as
the relevant guide to this inquiry: "[I]t is the disclosed intention which
governs, not any intention hidden in the mind of the agent, and
accordingly the agent may render himself personally liable, although this
is contrary to his actual intention if he has in fact bound himself
according to the terms of the contract."61
The determination of when a person "assumes to act as an agent" for
purposes of section 2343 ought to be based on the outward manifestations of such intent by the purported agent. The line of reasoning that
holds an attorney liable as a principal for witness fees in the absence of
a clear indication to the contrary is consistent with this construction.
Section 2343 thus should not be applied to most cases in which an
attorney retains an expert for assistance on litigation matters. Unless it
is clearly provided otherwise, the contract retaining the expert is not one
in which the attorney "assumes to act as an agent.".

B.

Custom

Expert witnesses usually look to the attorney who hired them as the
responsible party for the payment of fees. The expectation is that the
attorney has made satisfactory arrangements with the client respecting
reimbursement of the attorney for the compensation paid to the expert.
The attorney may draw upon an advance provided by the client, bill the
client as part of a regularly-scheduled presentment of costs incurred, or
defer reimbursement for all costs until the end of the litigation. The
specifics of such arrangements, however, are generally of no concern to
the expert. The expert contracted with the attorney to provide services
to the attorney, and the expert looks to the attorney for payment.
In Copp v. Breskin,62 a Washington state court of appeal recognized
this standard of business between attorney and client. In that case, an
expert hired by a law firm brought an action against the firm to recover
his fee when the client refused to pay. 63 The expert prevailed based on
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 552-53.
Id. at 552.
Id. (quoting 2 C.J. Agency § 487 (1915)).
782 P.2d 1104 (Wash Ct. App. 1989).
Id. at 1105.
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his reliance on the custom of looking to the attorney for the payment of
his fee. 64 The court reasoned as follows: "An agent may guarantee
performance by the principal, and the existence of a guarantee 'may be
shown by proof of a custom to that effect' ."65 Because both parties
were aware of the custom, it was easy for the court to make its
determination. 66 Moreover, the court in Copp reasoned that "[p]utting
the burden on the attorney promotes public trust and confidence in the
legal profession," which would be greatly endangered by allowing the
technical defense of disclosed agency. 67
Custom has also been an important factor as to an attorney's liability
in several cases involving litigation-support services other than expert
witnesses. 68 For instance, in holding an attorney personally liable for
a trial transcript ordered on behalf of the client, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas observed, "[t]he trial court followed the view that the attorney
should be responsible to a service provider in the absence of a disclaimer, and held Mr. McCullough liable for the costs of the transcript. It has
been said that this view reflects the trend by taking into account modem
litigation practices. We agree." 69
The emphasis on custom in assessing personal liability is also
consistent with the approach advanced by the American Law Institute.70
The Restatement on the Law Governing Lawyers makes the attorney
liable on contracts with a party who "normally deals with lawyers rather
than clients," even when the party knows the identity of the client for
whom the services were engaged.71 The Restatement recognizes that
the principles of agency law should rarely apply to these types of
contracts negotiated by an attorney. Simply disclosing the client's name

64. Id. at 1106.
65. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 328 cmt. b (1958)) ..
66. See id.
67. Id. at 1107.
68. See McCullough v. Johnson, 816 S.W.2d 886, 888 (Ark. 1991) (preparation of
transcript); Ingram v. Lupo, 726 S.W.2d 791, 797 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (preparation of
transcript); Anheluk v. Kubik, 374 N.W.2d 67; 69-70 (N.D. 1985) (court reporting
services); Roberts, Walsh & Co. v. Trugman, 264 A.2d 237, 239-40 (N.J. Super. 1970)
(court reporter services); Theuerkauf v. Sutton, 306 N.W.2d 651, 661 (Wis. 1981)
(professional accounting services for preparation of divorce cases).
69. McCullough, 816 S.W.2d at 888.
70. The approach is also similar to the personal liability rules for negotiable
instruments under the Uniform Commercial Code. Under the provision of the 1995
revision to Article 3, which deals with the liability of an agent who signs an instrument
on behalf of a principal, the agent may be personally liable on a negotiable instrument
if the agent's signature does not unambiguously refute personal liability. U.C.C. § 3402(b)(2) cmt. 2 (1997).
71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 42(2)(b) (Tentative
Draft No. 5, 1992).
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does not convey that the client, rather than the attorney, is to pay for the
services.72
In the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, an expert who
relies on custom to support a claim of personal liability of the attorney
will have to establish the existence of the custom in the locale in. which
the parties have dealt. Ac~l knowledge of the custom by the attorney
should not be required. Pervasive and consistent observance of the
custom by other attorneys and experts is sufficient to establish that the
attorney should be aware of the custom.
In some instances, the expert is much less likely to be successful in
asserting a claim based on custom. When experts are hired by a
government agency or by in-house counsel for a corporation, it is less
likely that they look to the attorney to pay their fees. In these cases, the
normal expectation of both the expert and the attorney is that the
attorney is not personally liable as a principal.
C.

Contract Terms and Interpretation

An attorney can, of course, avoid confusion over liability by being
explicitly clear with respect to the attorney's obligation when negotiating
with an expert. For example, the attorney can expressly indicate an
intention to undertake personal responsibility for payment of the expert's
fee. At the opposite extreme, an attorney is in the position to make it
clear that the client or an insurance carrier, not the attorney, is responsible for any obligations incurred with respect to compensating the
expert. 73 Difficulties arise, however, when the attorney leaves the
matter ambiguous concerning the party that incurs the payment
obligation.
When an attorney has allowed the question of who is to pay to go
unaddressed or otherwise to remain ambiguous, the rules of contract
interpretation may assist in providing a basis to construe the contract as
imposing personal liability on the attorney. The Restatement of
Contracts provision dealing with whose meaning prevails provides the
following standard:

72. Id. § 42(2)(b) cmt. d.
73. Of course, if the expert has dealt directly with the client with respect to
payment of the fee, and not with the attorney, the rationale for holding the attorney
liable is missing.
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Where the parties have attached different meanings to a promise or
agreement of a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with the meaning
attached by one of them if at the time the agreement was made . . . (b) that
party had no reason to know of any different meaning attached by the other,
and the other had reason to know the meaning attached by the first party. 74

If the expert lacked a reason to know that the attorney was not
contractually agreeing to be personally liable, and the attorney had
reason to know that the expert expected the attorney to be personally
liable, the agreement should be given a meaning consistent with the
expert's expectation. Because the customary practice is for experts to
look to attorneys for payment, the attorney typically has reason to know
of the meaning attached to an agreement by the expert.75
In discussing an attorney's responsibility for fees, the authors of
California Practice Guide: Civil Trials and Evidence, observe, "[u]nless
the expert agrees to look solely to the client for the payment of his or
her fees (few do), counsel employing an expert is responsible for
payment of the expert's fees and expenses incurred in attending trial."76
This source accurately states that the customary, contemporary practice
is for experts to look to the attorney, not the client or some other third
party, for the payment of fees. 77 It also places the responsibility for
payment on the attorney. 78
Whether an attorney for a disclosed principal binds himself or herself
contractually depends on the expectations that are reasonably created in
the expert, which must be ascertained from the facts. The language used
by the attorney to retain the expert can be significant to the analysis.
Language implicating liability of the attorney, such as "I want" or "I will
pay," combined with the absence of an express statement of an intention

74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(2)(b) (1981).
75. See supra Part III.B.
76. WEGNER ET AL., supra note 15, at ,r 1:222.
77. The California Practice Guide also contains the following important practice
pointer that may be helpful in avoiding the problem in the first instance: "Attorneys
usually have at least implied authority from their clients to employ expert witnesses.
Even so, it is good practice to ask for express authority before doing so; and to insist
upon adequate financial arrangements to assure payment of the expert's fees." Id. ,r
1:223.
78. The California Court of Appeal for the Second District recognized the general
obligation of an agent with the following observation:
Assuming that appellant did act as an agent he is liable unless it is made to
appear on the face of the instrument that the parties intended to bind only the
principal and not the agent. If an agent who signs an agreement in his own
name would avoid personal liability he must on the writing itself indicate his
intention to bind the principal only.
London v. Zachary, 207 P.2d 1067, 1068 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949) (citations omitted)
(contract for sale of wine distribution business).
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not to be personally liable, can provide the factual basis for imposing
personal liability.79
The expert assists the attorney based on the assurance of being paid,
and generally cares little whether that payment comes from the attorney
or the client. The expert also generally cares little what the terms are
with respect to the client's reimbursement of the attorney pursuant to the
attorney-client employment agreement. The fact that the attorney may
look elsewhere for reimbursement for the payment made to the expert
is not a basis for exempting the attorney from personal liability to the
expert.

D.

Efficiency and Ethics

The approach of holding an attorney liable for expert witness fees is
supported by sound policy considerations. · The attorney enters into
contracts with both the client and the expert, whereas the client and the
expert often are unlikely to have any direct dealings with each other.
This normal array of contacts among the participants is a sound reason
to hold attorneys personally liable if they do not undertake to negotiate
a different arrangement. This allocation of liability produces results that
promote both economic and judicial efficiency.
The attorney, not the expert, should be deemed to assume the risk of
ultimate nonpayment by the client or insurance carrier. This risk
allocation is economically efficient because, in agreeing to work for the
client, the attorney can influence the terms of the attorney-client
employment relationship. The attorney is in the best position to prevent
a financial loss by requiring the client to make adequate financial
reserves available to fund the litigation, including the expert's fees.
In contrast, the expert has little or no ability to influence the terms of
the contract between the attorney and the client. The contract is entered
into before the expert is even retained. Upon being retained, the expert
is not apt to have any direct dealings with the client. The expert is also
unlikely to rely on the client's creditworthiness or be apprised of the
terms in the contract between the attorney and the client. The attorney
may or may not have made adequate arrangements to assure the timely

79. Ingram v. Lupo, 726 S.W.2d 791, 796-97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Weeden Eng'g
Corp. v. Hale, 435 So.2d 1158, 1160-61 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
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availability of funds to pay the expert, but the expert generally is not
privy to these arrangements.
The attorney-client agreement often provides that, once the litigation
is completed, the client will reimburse the attorney for experts' fees and
other costs incurred by the attorney. Experts and consultants, however,
generally expect to be paid promptly after the completion of their
services. Most clients are unlikely to distinguish fees for experts from
other costs associated with the litigation, and thus may be inclined to
resist a direct billing from an expert. In fact, the client is likely to look
to the attorney to pay the expert and verify the appropriateness of any
fees claimed.
Because the use of experts is apt to increase the client's costs of
representation, the attorney and the client should come to a clear
understanding early in their relationship on both retaining experts and
the responsibility for paying them. 8 Failure to secure this agreement
can lead to misunderstandings and disputes, as well as possible
violations of the statutory provisions governing attorney-client fee
agreements. 81 The expert's compensation should not be held hostage
to these disputes because the expert has no influence or control over
their development or direction.
If a dispute arises with respect to the expert's fee, judicial efficiency
is advanced when the attorney is the party responsible for the fee. The
attorney hires the expert and therefore necessarily will have the details
of the terms originally agreed upon with the expert. The attorney, not
the client, is also aware of the directions and agreements that pass
between the attorney and the expert as they interact during the course of
the litigation. Because the expert provides services that are received and
utilized directly by the attorney, the attorney's assessment of the quantity
and quality of the expert's services can also be directly relevant in a
dispute concerning the expert's fee. The client, by way of contrast,
generally will have little direct contact with these matters or have the
independent ability to assess them.
Allowing the expert to recover against the attorney promotes the
smooth functioning of the judicial system. If the attorney can avoid
liability by claiming to be the agent of a disclosed principal, the expert

°

80. All attorney-client fee agreements must comply with the general requirements
of the California business and professions code. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE§§ 6147-48
(West 1990). In addition to requiring that such agreements be in writing when the total
expense to a client, including attorneys fees, exceeds $1,000, the law also requires that
the agreement contain "the respective responsibilities of the attorney and the client as
to the performance of the contract." Id. § 6!48(a)(3). Contingency fee agreements are
separately regulated. See id. § 6147.
81. See id. §§ 6146-48.
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will have to sue to the client or an insurance carrier for the collection of
the fee. Because the client or carrier normally will not have dealt with
the expert, the attorney ultimately will have to participate in the
litigation by joinder or as a witness in order to resolve the claim, making
the process unnecessarily complicated and costly. In most cases, these
complications and costs can be minimized by imposing liability directly
on the attorney.
The refusal of an attorney to pay for services after having contracted
for them has also been held to constitute an ethics violation. The court
in Copp v. Breskin stated, "[t]he Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit
attorneys from using the ignorance of litigation service providers to their
:financial advantage." 82 The court quoted a Washington State Bar
Association ethics opinion that addressed the circumstances of an
attorney ordering services without clarifying that the provider was to
look only to the client for payment. The ethics opinion concluded, "[i]n
this circumstance it would be the ethical obligation of the attorney to pay
such indebtedness and then look to [the] client for reimbursement and
assume the risk of nonpayment."83
The actions of the attorney in Copp misled the service provider, and
it was implicit from the court's opinion that the attorney's actions
constituted a dereliction in the duty of preserving the professional
image. 84 As Copp illustrates, recognizing the attorney as a principal in
contracts with service providers is consistent with upholding ethical
standards in the legal profession. 85

IV.

THE ATTORNEY AS AN AGENT

Some jurisdictions hold that an attorney who orders goods and
services in connection with litigation is not personally liable in contract
when the attorney was acting as an agent for a disclosed principal. In
Free v. Wilmar J. Helric Co.,86 for example, a geologist brought an
82. Copp v. Breskin, 782 P.2d 1104, 1105 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
83. Id. (quoting Wash. State Bar Ass'n., Ethics Op. 140 (1969)).
84. See id. at 1105-06.
85. One of the complaints of professional misconduct charged against an attorney
in Minnesota was based on the attorney's requesting services of court reporters and
process servers without informing them that he would not be liable for such payments.
See In re Peters, 332 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Minn. 1983). The court held that the attorney was
liable for such services. Id. at 17.
86. 688 P.2d 117 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
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action against a law :firm for his fee. 87 The plaintiff, contacted initially
by a partner in the law firm to restake the client's mining claim, was
told that the firm represented the client. 88 The plaintiff informed the
defendant of his daily and hourly rates, and the defendant agreed to
them. 89
A factual dispute centered on the billing procedure to be followed.
The plaintiff testified that the attorney said, "send me the bill."90 The
attorney admitted this statement, but testified that he also told the
plaintiff, as was his practice, that the bill would be forwarded to the
client for payment. 91 The attorney responded to the plaintiff's request
for payment by writing that the bill had been forwarded to "our mutual
client."92 The plaintiff then wrote to the law firm telling them that he
considered the law :firm to be his client. 93 When the law :firm denied
liability, the plaintiff sued. 94
The Oregon Court of Appeals held that the law :firm was not
personally liable on the contract because it acted as an agent for a
disclosed principal.95 The plaintiff cited cases from other jurisdictions
holding the attorney personally liable on the theory that the attorney was
a principal. 96 The court, however, found the reasoning of those cases
to be unpersuasive based on the application of section 320 of the
Restatement of Agency. 97 The court based its decision on the theory

87. Id. at 118-19.
88. Id. at 119.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 120. The court also reasoned that the law firm was not liable in contract
under a theory of account stated because it had no duty to object to the bill and because
no debtor-creditor relationship existed between the law firm and the plaintiff. Id.
96. Id. at 120 n.2.
97. See id. at 120 n.2, n.3. Comment b of section 320 reads:
One bringing an action upon a contract has the burden of showing that the
other is a party to it. The initial burden is satisfied if the plaintiff proves that
the defendant has made a promise, the form of which does not indicate that it
was given as an agent. The defendant then has the burden of going forward
if he wishes to show that his promise was made only as an agent and that this
should have been so understood. Unless barred by the parol evidence rule or
some similar rule existing in the case of integrated documents (see §§ 323325), an agent sued by the other party to a contract satisfies the burden of
going forward by showing that it was known to the other that he was acting
as agent for a disclosed principal and, unless further facts are shown, a
judgment for the agent should be directed.
Id. n.3 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 320 cmt. B (1958)).
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that the attorney disclosed his representative agency status to the
plaintiff.98
This approach to the issue of attorney liability has been followed by
other courts. 99 In Eppler, Guerin & Truner, Inc. v. Kasmir,' 00 an
investment banking firm which had performed appraisal services brought
an action to recover fees. 101 The plaintiff had been hired by the
defendants to render an opinion on the value of certain securities that
were the subject of a suit between the defendant's client and the Internal
Revenue Service. 102 The plaintiff knew at the time it was hired that
the defendants were attorneys representing the client in the pending
suit. 103 The plaintiff prepared a letter agreement addressed to the
defendants that outlined the details of employment. Among other things,
the letter stated that the billings for this opinion and for testimony in
court "shall be rendered to your firm." 104
The Texas Court of Appeals held that firm was not liable. 105 It
reasoned that, when an attorney contracts with a third party for the
benefit of a client for goods or services to be used in connection with
attorney's representation and the third party is aware of those facts, the
attorney is not liable on the contract unless the attorney assumes some
type of special liability. 106 It found that the law firm had not specially
undertaken liability for payment of appraisal fees. 107
In Part 111, we advanced the reasons for rejecting this approach to
liability, which simply categorizes the attorney as an agent. This
misguided approach applies agency concepts to the attorney-client
relationship without seriously examining the premises underlying the
categorization. Part 111 provided ample reasoning for the premise that
an attorney should not be considered to be an agent with respect to
contractual liability to the expert.

98. See id. at 119.
99. See Mccorkle v. Weinstein, 365 N.E.2d 953, 955-56 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (court
reporting services); Rayvid v. Burgh, 234 N.Y.S.2d 868, 870-71 (1962) (services of
stenographer).
100. 685 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
101. Id. at 738.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 739.
106. Id. at 738.
107. Id. at 739.
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In Part III, we also explained how section 2343 of the California Civil
Code should not pose an obstacle to applying the desired reasoning to
cases that arise in California. The explanation centered upon the finding
that the statute is inapplicable in most cases in which attorneys retain
experts. An attorney who hires an expert without clarifying that the
expert must look solely to the client is not acting as an agent and should
therefore be held liable as a principal.
Even if a court were to find otherwise and apply section 2343, this
section contains independent justifications for imposing liability in many
cases. Section 2343 limits an agent's liability to third persons to the
following categories of cases: "1. When, with his consent, credit is
given to him personally in a transaction; 2. When he enters into a
written contract in the name of his principal, without believing, in good
faith, that he has authority to do so; or, 3. When his acts are wrongful
in their nature." 108 Each of the situations might come into play in an
attorney's dealings with expert witnesses. The remainder of this part of
the Article examines each category to demonstrate how personal liability
of the attorney might be sustained.

A.

Personal Credit

Liability can attach to an attorney when credit given by an expert
extends to the attorney personally. Unless the expert works against a
retainer paid in advance, services provided by the expert constitute an
extension of credit. Credit can also be extended to the attorney when
the expert performs services beyond the initial retainer. Because most
experts deal exclusively with the attorney and provide services that the
attorney uses in fulfilling his or her own responsibilities to the client, the
credit is given to the attorney personally.
This credit-extension theory has been the basis of liability in claims
made against attorneys by court reporters for services rendered in
connection with making or furnishing copies of depositions. 109 In
developing this rationale, courts have been influenced by the reliance of
experts on the credit of the lawyer. Investigation of the credit worthiness of the client would be both difficult and costly, and undoubtedly
would increase the cost of the expert's services. Furthermore, courts
have also noted that experts may be reluctant to deal with attorneys or

108. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 2343 (West 1985).
109. Brown & Huseby, Inc. v. Chrietzberg, 248 S.E.2d 631, 633-34 (Ga. 1978);
Roberts, Walsh & Co. v. Trugman, 264 A.2d 237, 239 (N.J. Super. 1970).
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to extend them credit ooless they are personally accountable. llO This
reluctance to deal with attorneys is undesirable as a matter of public
policy because in some cases it could adversely affect the provision of
adequate legal services.
Further considerations also support the policy. Suppliers of services
generally will have an easier opportunity obtaining payment directly
from the attorney rather than the client. Some suppliers will be parties
that the attorney uses on a frequent, basis. Proceeding against the client
can be more difficult, particularly since the amounts in a single case may
be relatively small. Intrusion of the expert against the client can also
have a disruptive influence on the attorney-client relationship.
The American Law Institute has utilized comparable reasoning to
support its position that most suppliers of goods and services used by an
attorney, including experts, should have a claim directly against the
attorney, even when the client's identity is disclosed:
Merely disclosing the client's name to [providers of goods or services used
by a lawyer], for example by asking a printer to print the appellant's brief in
a named case, does not convey that the client rather than the lawyer is to pay.
Such persons are likely to rely on the credit of the lawyer, because they
regularly deal with lawyers, while investigating the reliability of the client may
be costly and would raise the price of the goods or services. 111

An expert who performs services requested by an attorney without
receiving a retainer to cover the cost of those services is advancing
credit against the expectation of being paid. Most experts or other
suppliers of goods and services do not approach their extension of credit
in the abstract without any concern as to whom they grant the credit.
They rely upon an identified party, and generally that party is the
attorney who engages them to provide the requested services. Because
any other finding would defy both the facts and significant supporting
policies, in the absence of explicit evidence to the contrary, the credit
extended by an expert should be treated as extended to the attorney
personally.

110. Roberts, Walsh & Co., 264 A.2d at 239 (court reporter testified that he would
not deal with non-lawyers).
·
11 l. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 42(2)(b) cmt. d
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 1992).
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B.

Bad-Faith Belief Concerning Authority

Section 2343 makes an agent liable "[w]hen he enters into a written
contract in the name of his principal, without believing, in good faith,
that he has authority to do so." 112 An attorney purporting to act on a
client's behalf warrants that he or she has the proper authority. 113 If
the client repudiates the contract with the expert as unauthorized and
refuses to pay, the attorney could be liable on a l?reach of warran~
theory. This claim may be formulated on a contract or tort theory. 1 4
The claim would be most persuasive when the attorney told the expert
that express authorization of the client was required and then subsequently misrepresented such authorization to the expert. An alternatively
plausible scenario would be that the attorney had procrastinated in
securing the client's authorization, proceeded with the expert because of
the necessity of preparing the litigation, and subsequently learned that
the client would not authorize retaining the expert. The lack of good
faith of the agent, however, is sufficient grounds to hold the agent
personally liable on the contract with the expert, even if the agent does
not go so far as to make actual misrepresentations. The attorney only
needs to lack a good faith belief concerning his or her authority.
This particular part of section 2343 may be relevant even if the section
is construed as we have urged in Part III. Whenever the attorney does
not take the initiative to clarify that only the client will be responsible
for the expert's fee, the better analysis that we .have advocated is to find
that the attorney acts as a principal rather than as an agent. Because the
attorney is not acting as an agent, this analysis precludes the applicability of section 2343. The attorney might, however, avoid the status of a
principal. Whenever the attorney expressly disclaims any personal
responsibility for the expert's fee, the attorney has made it clear that he
or she is not acting as a principal, but rather that the expert will have to
look to the client or insurance carrier for the fee. In these cases, the
attorney would indeed be acting as an agent and section 2343 should
apply. If the attorney engages the expert without a good faith belief in
his or her authority, the attorney, even as an agent, would incur personal
liability to the expert.

112. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2343 (West 1985).
113. "One who assumes to act as an agent thereby warrants, to all who deal with
him in that capacity, that he has the authority which he assumes." Id. § 2342.
114. See Part II.A.
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C.

Wrongful Acts

Section 2343 makes an agent liable "[w]hen his acts are wrongful in
nature." 115 Wrongful acts would certainly include tortious actions
directed toward the expert, such as intentional misrepresentation,
negligent misrepresentation, and false promises. Whether the concept of
"wrongful" should be read more broadly to include any and all wrongful
acts done in the course of representing the client is not as clear.
Similarly, uncertainty exists as to whether the concept of "wrongful"
may also reach unethical conduct.
1.

Wrongful Conduct and the Discovery Process

In assessing whether an attorney acted wrongfully, consideration
should certainly be given to the representations made by the attorney to
the court and to opposing counsel during the discovery process.
Representing to opposing counsel that one has retained the services of
an expert is an important strategic decision that is relevant to negotiations in most cases. The designation of an expert as a witness is a
representation of a material fact. The representation must be truthful and
accurate to all concerned, and if it is not, a broad application of the
statute would consider it to be wrongful.
As part of the judicial process of designating a person as an expert,
the attorney makes representations pursuant to the exchange of
information concerning experts. The California code of civil procedure
requires formal disclosure of the names of expert witnesses and the
general substance of the testimony that the expert is expected to
give. 116 The attorney represents to the court and to opposing counsel
that the expert has agreed to testify at trial and that the expert will be
sufficiently familiar with the pending action to provide a meaningful oral
deposition concerning the specific trial testimony that the expert is
expected to give. 117 In effect, these representations require the attorney
to "guarantee" that the expert really will be available to testify at the
trial. 118 The disclosure must be signed by the attorney under penalty
115.
116.
117.
118.

CAL. CIV. CODE§ 2343 (West 1985).

Id. § 2034 (West Supp. 1997); see also FED. R. CIV. PROC. § 26(a)(2).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 2034(t)(2)(C)-(D) (West Supp. 1997).
FLAHAv AN ET AL., supra note 7, at ,r 6:450.
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of perjury. Disclaiming the existence of any contract with the expert
after designating the expert pursuant to the discovery process would be
a clear situation involving wrongful conduct. In making the disclosures
required by the law of discovery, the attorney must be scrupulous with
respect to the truthfulness of the disclosures concerning the use of expert
testimony.

2.

Wrongful Conduct and the Rules of Professional Conduct

The Rules of Professional Conduct are intended to establish standards
governing discipline of members of the bar. 119 Conduct by a member
of the bar that is contrary to these rules does not automatically give rise
to a civil cause of action. However, unethical conduct on the part of the
attorney nevertheless might be considered by a court to be "wrongful"
for purposes of assessing personal liability. Obviously, the permutations
of unethical conduct vary considerably, but three situations are especially
noteworthy in the context of possible claims by expert witnesses.
First, when a client has advanced costs or reimbursed an attorney for
the payment of expert witness fees or other costs, and the attorney fails
to apply the funds properly, a serious ethical issue is presented.
Improper handling of entrusted funds is a breach of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. It also would be potentially wrongful under
section 2343, and thus be a distinct rationale for imposing liability. 120
A second noteworthy variety of wrongful conduct arises when an
expert witness withdraws from a case prior to its conclusion. In the
initial contact with the expert, the attorney would probably discuss both
the case and the expert's willingness to act as an expert. Based on their
discussion, the attorney might designate the expert as a witness pursuant
to the laws of discovery, but without an executed engagement letter or
contract with the expert or without the expert's explicit authority to
designate. If the expert contacts the attorney with respect to the status
of the case before it is settled or tried, the attorney may equivocate as
to whether the expert is actually retained. At this point, the knowledgeable expert may demand payment of a retainer or demand that the
attorney withdraw the designation as a witness. Once the expert revokes
"the implied authority to designate him, the attorney may not continue
to use the expert's name." 121 At this point, the attorney has the duty

119. Ames v. State Bar, 506 P.2d 625, 629 (Cal. 1973).
120. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2343 (West 1985).
121. Los Angeles County Bar Ass 'n, Professional Responsibility and Ethics Comm.,
Ethics Op. 482 (1995).
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to inform the court and opposing counsel. 122 Failure to do so may
constitute a violation of either the California Rules of Professional
Conduct, 123 the Business and Profession Code, 124 or both. It should
also be considered wrongful to the expert.
A final type of conduct that may trigger liability on the basis that it
is unethical relates to an attorney's failure to pay. The California
Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct of the
State Bar of California has issued an opinion in which it states the
following:
It is unethical for an attorney to fail to pay reasonable reporter's fees for
contracted services. However, such failure will subject the attorney to
discipline only where the attorney intended not to pay the fees when he
contracted for the services. That intent may be inferred from delayed payment
and other circumstances. 125

The Committee noted two circumstances justifying the inference of an
intent not to pay for the services: "[F]irst, where the attorney failed to
advise the reporter in writing at the time the services were contracted
that he would not be responsible for payment and then seeks to excuse
nonpayment on the basis his client is solely responsible for the fees; and,
second, failure to respond to communications from the reporter regarding
nonpayment of the fees." 126 The opinion is equally applicable to a
refusal to pay expert witness fees because the expert, like the reporter,
is providing a service to the attorney.
At this point, certain applicable concepts begin to fold into each other.
In the context of an expert's fees, the unethical conduct of refusing to
pay should establish that the attorney's acts are wrongful in nature. This
conclusion would be sufficient to bind the attorney even if the attorney

122. Id.
123. In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a member: (A) Shall employ, for the
purposes of maintaining the causes confided to the member such means only
as are consistent with truth; (B) Shall not seek to mislead the judge, judicial
officer, or jury by an artifice or false statement of law or fact.
CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5-200 (A)-(B) (1996).
124. It is the duty of an attorney "[t]o employ, for the purpose of maintaining the
causes confided to him or her such means only as are consistent with truth, and never
to seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by artifice or false statement of fact
or law." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(d) (West Supp. 1997).
125. The State Bar of California, Comm. on Professional Responsibility and
Conduct, Formal Op. 1979-48 (1979)
126. Id. (citation omitted).
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were characterized as assuming to act as an agent for purposes of
California civil code section 2343. That characterization results in
circular reasoning, however, because there has to be an underlying basis
to support the recognition of the attorney's failure to pay as an ethical
violation. The unstated premise in the finding of unethical conduct is
that the attorney has a duty to pay for these services. The duty arises
through the contract with the expert and is personal to the attorney, thus
again demonstrating that the preferable approach for purposes of section
2343 is to find that the attorney is not acting as an agent of the client
when contracting for expert witness services.

V.

CONCLUSION

The special characteristics associated with the attorney-client
relationship provide a normative justification for treating the attorney as
a principal, not an agent, when contracting with an expert. An attorney
can avoid personal liability, but to do so the attorney must contractually
disclaim responsibility to the expert at the time the expert is retained.
The burden is on the attorney to indicate clearly that he or she does not
intend to be liable to the expert and that the expert must instead look to
the client or an insurance carrier for payment of the expert's fee. The
traditional approach of treating the attorney as an agent for a disclosed
principal should not be sufficient to shield the attorney from personal
liability.
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